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Abstract 
In this chapter, we evaluate the impact of fertilizer credit on crop choice, crop yield, and 
income using two-year panel data of 420 households in rural Ethiopia. The fertilizer 
credit is found to increase input application for crop production. As a consequence, it 
has a substantial impact on the yield of teff. We also find that the impact on net crop 
income per cultivated area and also on per capita income is marginal because of the low 
profitability due to the low output price and high input cost of agricultural production. 
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1. Introduction 
Ethiopia is not only one of the poorest countries in the world, but also one of 
the most populated countries: it is the 14
th
 largest in the world and the second largest in 
Africa. To feed the large and growing population, agricultural production has to be 
increased by improving the agricultural productivity per land area because most of 
accessible fertile lands have been cultivated. To improve the agricultural productivity, 
the Ethiopian government has been implementing policies under the Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) and, more recently, the Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). In particular, 
Ethiopian regional governments initiated a 100 percent credit guarantee scheme on 
farmers’ fertilizer purchases in 1994. Currently, it is said that about 90 percent of 
fertilizer is delivered on credit at below-market interest or even at zero interest. 
Subsequently, the total fertilizer use has increased from 250,000 tons in 1995 to 400,000 
tons in 2008 (Spielman et al. 2010).  
The credit scheme in Ethiopia, however, raises some concerns, as many other 
top-down credit schemes in developing countries do. First, the input distribution tied to 
credit may limit the emergence of private sector retailers, as pointed out by Jayne et al. 
(2003). Second, the public input distribution tends to deliver inputs, which are of 
low-quality and arrive, too late. Spielman et al. (2010), for instance, quote a study 
which finds that half of the surveyed Ethiopian smallholders reported that their fertilizer 
arrived after planting, and 25 percent complained of the poor quality of the fertilizer 
they received. Third, the application of standard packages to very diverse environments 
in Ethiopia may lead to a low efficiency of fertilizer use. Thus, it is very important to 
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evaluate the impact of the fertilizer credit scheme on the farm productivity and welfare 
of the farmers. Fortunately, there are large variations in the use of credit access across 
regions and over time, and such variations provide an opportunity to evaluate the effects 
of the credit scheme on crop production and income using panel data.
1
 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to evaluate the impact of the credit 
scheme on the inorganic fertilizer application, the crop yields, and the crop income, by 
using a two-year panel data of 420 households in rural Ethiopia. The major obstacle to 
identifying a causal impact of a credit scheme is that farmers voluntarily participate in 
such schemes rather than being randomly assigned. To overcome or mitigate the 
possible self-selection biases, we take advantage of the panel data by controlling for 
unobserved household characteristics. The results in this chapter suggest that the credit 
increases inorganic fertilizer use per ha but has only limited impacts on crop yields. The 
limited impacts are likely due to low adoption rates of high-yielding varieties which 
should ideally accompany with the inorganic fertilizer use. We find that only about 10 
percent of our sampled farmers cultivate high-yielding maize or wheat varieties, while 
others apply the inorganic fertilizer on local varieties of maize and wheat. As a result, 
the credit has little impacts on crop income.  
 This paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 explains the changes in 
                                            
1 It is worth noting that the inputs provided by regional governments or cooperatives on credit 
are highly subsidized and, hence, they can provide those inputs at very low or even zero interest 
rate. Because of the high inflation rate in Ethiopia, the low interest rate means that the real 
interest rate is negative. Hence, “the input credit” has two different effects. The first is the effect 
of easing credit constraints by obtaining the credit for the purchase of the inputs. The second is 
the effect through the change in relative prices of the inputs. In this paper, the effect of “the 
input credit” means the mixed effect of those two components. 
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inorganic fertilizer policies in Ethiopia and its current situation. Section 4.3 describes 
the household survey data used for this study. Section 4.4 presents the empirical 
findings on the effect of the provision of input credit on inorganic fertilizer application, 
crop yield, and income. Finally, we discuss the policy implications based on the results 
we obtained. 
 
2. Fertilizer and Credit Policies in Ethiopia 
Even when new technologies appear to be very profitable to crop scientists 
and economists, farmers may not adopt them (Feder et al., 1985; Munshi, 2008; Duflo 
et al. 2008). One of major constraints for small-scale farmers to adopt agricultural 
technologies is credit (e.g. Croppenstedt et al., 2003; Gine and Klonner, 2006; Zerfu and 
Larson, 2010) since cash resources are generally insufficient to cover high-yielding 
variety seeds and chemical fertilizer purchase for small-scale farmers at the planting 
season. Despite the importance of credit, the private financial sector is underdeveloped 
especially in rural areas due to high and correlated risks in smallholder agriculture, 
asymmetric information between borrower farmers and credit providers as well as 
incomplete enforcement of credit contracts. Thus, public intervention to credit market 
has been justified for on the purpose of improving formal credit access of small-scale 
farmers. In spite of the potential of public intervention in on financial services for 
small-scale farmers, however, such an intervention has to be considered with caution 
because there are some drawbacks. Firstly, it may crowd out private financial service 
providers that would be more efficient than public providers. Secondly, a certain type of 
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public intervention such as agricultural lending and input credit is often used as an 
instrument of political capture and, hence, persistently continued even when it does not 
have measurable impact on agricultural output (Cole 2004).
2
  
Historically in Ethiopia, a government parastatal called Agricultural Input 
Supply Enterprise (AISE) controlled the importation, distribution, and pricing of 
inorganic fertilizer during the Dergue regime (1974-1987). The Ethiopian government 
began curtailing the operation of the official state marketing board under foreign aid 
-conditionality agreements with donors since 1993. The private sector was allowed to 
participate in fertilizer importation and distribution following the issuance of the 
National Fertilizer Policy (Jayne et al., 2003). As a result, some private companies 
entered into the sector. The government, however, gave favorable treatments toward 
regional holding companies which competed with the private companies. The favorable 
treatments included the allocation of foreign exchanges for the importation and 
distribution of fertilizer through government administered credit to farmers. Because of 
these favorable treatments toward regional holding companies, private companies found 
it impossible to compete with them, and all of the private companies exited from the 
market by 2000. Since then, the distribution system of inorganic fertilizer has been 
dominated by AISE and a small number of the regional holding companies (Spielman et 
al., 2010). 
In recent years, under the SDPRP and the PASDEP, the government has 
started providing substantial resources to the regional governments to enhance 
                                            
2 Conning and Udry (2007) provide a comprehensive review of financial 
sector in rural areas of low-income countries. 
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agricultural production. To attain several goals of the PASDEP, the government has been 
restructuring and strengthening cooperatives. Corresponding to the government action, 
the number of members participating in cooperatives has increased rapidly, and hence 
the cooperatives have gained significant more power than before. Since 2004, several 
cooperative unions have started to operate in the distribution of agricultural inputs at the 
regional level. The farmers’ cooperatives have replaced the AISE in the importation and 
distribution of fertilizer. The cooperatives currently provide about 56 percent of the total 
supply of fertilizer. The cooperatives provide short-term credit on fertilizer purchases to 
farmers under a 100 percent credit guarantee scheme by the regional governments. The 
largest source of such agricultural credit is the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) 
serving more than 2.5 million farmers. As of 2006, two regional holding companies 
(Ambassel and Wondo), the fertilizer parastatal (AISE), and cooperative unions 
accounted for 100 percent of fertilizer imports and local distributions. 
Partly due to the credit scheme, as mentioned earlier, the total fertilizer 
consumption in Ethiopia has increased from 250,000 tons in 1995 to 400,000 tons in 
2008 (Spielman et al., 2010). However, the intensity of the fertilizer use has increased 
only marginally over the past decade from 31 kilograms per ha in 1995 to 36 kilograms 
per ha in 2008. The increase in the total fertilizer consumption has been absorbed 
largely by area expansion. Moreover, despite the huge PASDEP demonstration 
programs, only 37 percent of farmers were using inorganic fertilizer (Spielman et al., 
2010). A study cited in Spielman et al. (2010) found that half of the farmers surveyed 
for the study reported that the fertilizer arrived after planting. It also found that 32 
percent of the surveyed farmers reported underweight bags, and 25 percent complained 
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of the poor quality. Also, unlike neighboring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia does not 
offer fertilizer in smaller packages that could be used by smallholders or in different 
formulations needed for different types of agro-climates, soils, and crops. Thus, the 
application of standard packages to vastly diverse environments in Ethiopia and the 
non-optimal use of these packages by farmers lead to low fertilizer production 
efficiency and returns to investment. Much of the discussion on the effects of the 
fertilizer credit production efficiency, however, is based on secondary macro data or 
from small cross-sectional case studies. There is a need for a rigorous impact study that 
is based on a wide area which relies on individual panel data set.  Panel data enables 
one by which we can observe the changing behaviors of the same farm households with 
and without fertilizer credit. The drastic changes in the distributions of inorganic 
fertilizer in recent years create substantial variations across regions in access to input 
credit. Such variations provide us an opportunity to evaluate the effect of the input 
credit on input use, crop yields, and farmers’ welfare in Ethiopia.  
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data 
The data used in this paper have been collected through the RePEAT 
household survey in rural Ethiopia by the FASID/GRIPS research team in 2004 and 
2006. The survey covers 42 villages in 11 zones located within a 400 km radius from 
Addis Ababa. In each village, 10 households were randomly selected in 2004 and 
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re-interviewed in 2006.
3
 All the households in the survey engage in agriculture. The 
survey villages belong to three regions; Amhara, Oromia, and SNNP. Out of the 42 
survey villages, 21 are located in Oromia, which is the largest region surrounding Addis 
Ababa and has several different agro-ecological zones. Hence, we divide the Oromia 
region into three sub-regions (SoutheastSouth East, Central, and West) with 
consideration of the differences in their farming systems for the following analyses. We 
present the summary statistics of the sample households by region in Table 1. 
The proportion of households using inorganic fertilizer varies from 33 percent 
in the Amhara region to 91 percent in Oromia Central. On average, about two-thirds of 
the sample households applied at least some inorganic fertilizer. This is a high 
proportion by African standards. The main reason for the high inorganic fertilizer use is 
the credit that farmers receive. In Table 1, we find that about 46 percent of the sample 
farmers received credit in 2004, and that the proportion increased to 63 percent in 2006. 
The South East and Central regions of Oromia have high proportions of farmers 
receiving credit. This is likely to reflect the high intensities of government investment 
and effort in delivering public interventions on input credit by the regional government. 
Partly because of the credit programs in these locations, the amounts of inorganic 
fertilizer applied on crop production are very high in these sub regions. The amount of 
inorganic fertilizer applied is about 121 kilograms per ha in 2004 and 109 kilograms per 
ha in 2006 in the South East region of Oromia and is 59 kilograms per ha and 68 
kilograms per ha in the West region. In contrast, in the Amhara region, where only less 
                                            
3
 In the following analyses, 12 out of 420 households are dropped due to missing information 
on variables of interest in the 2004 data while 9 households are dropped due to attrition in the 
2006 survey.   
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than 20 percent of the sample households received credit in 2004 and 2006, the level of 
inorganic fertilizer application is at the lowest among the sample regions. Thus, we 
suspect that the credit access has significant impacts on the use and amount of fertilizer 
application. We need to be cautious about the causal relationship between the credit and 
fertilizer use because it is possible that the causality goes the other direction. The 
provision of credit by the regional credit programs might be provided in regions where 
fertilizer demand is already high and, hence, its use is effective.  
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
To identify the causal relationship between credit and fertilizer use, we divide 
the samples into four groups based on their access to credit: Non Recipients, Late 
Recipients, Early Recipients, and Continuous Recipients. Non Recipients include 
households who did not obtain credit in both 2004 and 2006. Late Recipients include 
households who did not obtain credit in 2004 but obtained it in 2006. In contrast, Early 
Recipients include households who obtained credit in 2004 but did not in 2006. Finally, 
Continuous Recipient includes households who obtained credit in both 2004 and 2006. 
The examination of the fertilizer applications of these groups, may indicate how much 
the fertilizer application by these groups will show how much fertilizer use changes 
when the credit access changes over time at the household level.  
In Table 2, we find that, among the Late Recipients group, the fertilizer 
application increases by 37 kilograms per ha, from 54 kilograms per ha in 2004 to 91 
kilograms per ha in 2006, when they gained access to credit in 2006. The change is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, since there is a downward 
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trend in the fertilizer use over the years among sample households, the ‘true’ effect of 
Because we find the increase in the fertilizer application among the same households 
over time, this increase is likely to be caused by the credit access could be larger than 37 
kilograms per ha among the Late Recipient households.. On the other hand, among the 
Early Recipients group, we find a decrease in fertilizer application by 19 kilograms per 
ha, as they lost their access to credit from 2004 to 2006. Among the other two groups, 
Non Recipients and Continuous Recipients, we find slight declines in fertilizer 
applications, but the absolute amount. Thus, it seems that there is a downward trend in 
the fertilizer use over the years among sample households. This suggests that, in the 
absence of fertilizer used by Continuous Recipients is several times the amount used by 
Non Recipients. The real causal impact of these support the hypothesis that credit is 
very important for fertilizer purchase and use the credit access could be larger than the 
37 kilograms per ha among the Enter households. 
To investigate the impacts of the credit program on crop yields, we first look 
at the crop choice of the farmers with and without credit. In Table 3, we present the crop 
choice in 2004 and 2006 grouped by the credit status, as in Table 2. What should be 
noted in this table is that proportions of farmers who cultivate high-yielding varieties 
(HYV) are very low in Ethiopia. For instance, the proportion of the sample farmers who 
cultivate HYV maize is only 7 and 9 percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Likewise, 
the proportion of the sampled farmers who cultivate HYV wheat is only 11 and 9 
percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Even when we disaggregate the sampled 
farmers by the credit access status, we do not find a high proportion of HYV adopters 
among those who received credit. For instance, only 7 percent of Continuous Recipients 
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cultivated HYV maize in both 2004 and 2006. Among the same Continuous Recipients, 
we find that about 30 percent of them cultivate local maize. Thus, among maize 
producers in this group, only 20 percent of them cultivate HYV maize. Among Late 
Recipient households who did not receive credit in 2004 but received it in 2006, we find 
an increase in the proportion of those who cultivate HYV maize from 6 percent in 2004 
to 17 percent in 2006 and a decline in the proportion of those who cultivated local 
maize from 41 percent in 2004 to 29 percent in 2006. Thus, it seems that the HYV 
maize adoption rate responds to the availability of the fertilizer credit to some extent 
among this group, although the proportion of the maize producers who adopt HYV 
maize is only 37 percent even among this group in 2006 when they receive the credit. 
In contrast, the HYV adoption rate does not respond to the availability of the 
fertilizer credit among wheat producers. Among the Late Recipient group, the 
proportion of the farmers who adopt HYV wheat is 13 percent before receiving the 
credit and just at 12 percent even when they receive the credit. Among the same group, 
about 40 percent of the farmers produce local wheat, thus the HYV wheat adoption rate 
remains about 22 percent. With low adoption rates of high-yielding varieties of maize 
and wheat, it is unlikely that the fertilizer credit program would havehas large impacts 
on the crop yields because local varieties have low response rates to fertilizer use in 
general.  
To examine the impacts of the credit on the crop yields, we present the 
average yields of major cereal crops by the credit is used or access in Table 4. In the 
table, we find that the average yields of teff and local wheat are higher when the credit 
is available than it is not available. The overall average of the teff yield is 665 kilograms 
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per ha. It is 553 kilograms per ha when credit is not available, while it increases to 704 
kilograms per ha when credit is available. The difference of these two is about 151 
kilograms per ha, which is a 27 percent increase. Credit The credit also increases the 
average yield of local wheat from 808 kilograms per ha to 1,072 kilograms per ha. The 
increase is about 264 kilograms per ha, which is a 33 percent increase. Thus, it seems 
that the credit access increases the yields of teff and local wheat, although the average 
yields of these crops with credit are still at a very low level by international standards. 
The credit, however, is expected to increase the yields of HYV varieties to a greater 
extent because the credit increases the inorganic fertilizer application on the HYV 
varieties which are much more fertilizer responsive. Indeed, we find higher yields on 
HYV maize and wheat when the credit is available than when it is not available in Table 
4, although differences in the yields are small in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant. The weak impacts of the credit on the average yields of these HYV crops 
suggest some problems with the HYV varieties, such as unsuitability to the particular 
site, inappropriate application of inorganic fertilizer on the HYV varieties or poor 
quality of these HYV seeds. To confirm and further understand these findings, we need 
a more rigorous approach. In the following sections, we use multiple regression models 
in which we can control for external factors such as agro-ecological conditions and 
farmer characteristics in addition to the credit availability of credit.  
 
4. Empirical Models and Variables 
The main purpose of this chapter is to identify the impacts of the credit access 
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to public sector fertilizer credit on the inorganic fertilizer application, yields, and 
income. We use a binary indicator representing whether a household obtains the input 
credit in each of the two years. The major issue on estimating such impacts is the 
endogeneity of the credit access variable. Households who receive credit may have 
different characteristics than those who do not receive credit. Those who receive credit 
may be more capable or located in more fertile areas than those who do not receive 
credit. This can create a spurious correlation between the credit use and the crop yields 
or income. To overcome this issue, we employ the difference-in-differences approach 
with time-variant control variables. The basic empirical model can be written as a 
simple regression form: 
ijtjtiijtijtijt xdy ενδβα ++++= ,  (1) 
where yijt is the yield or the income of household i in region j at time t; dijt is a dummy 
variable taking 1 if household i received the credit at time t; xijt is a vector of household 
characteristics; iδ  is a time-invariant household component which represents 
unobserved household characteristics; jtν  is a time-variant region component; ijtε  is 
household specific transitory shock that has mean zero at each time t. Our focus is to 
estimate the coefficient of the credit dummy, that is, α . By estimating the household 
fixed effects model, we can eliminate the time-invariant household component, iδ , 
which could be correlated with the independent variables including the credit dummy, 
dijt.  
One drawback of the household fixed effects model is that all of the 
time-invariant household characteristics would be excluded from the model, along with
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δi. Thus, we are unable to estimate the coefficients of some of the important household 
characteristics, such as the education level and the gender of the household head, and 
the soil fertility because we have only one time observation of the soil fertility. Despite 
the drawback, however, we prefer estimating the household fixed effects model because 
our purpose is to identify the impacts of the input credit program on the agricultural 
productivity and income.  
 
5. Results  
5.1 Determinants of use of access to fertilizer credit 
We estimate the determinants of the use of access to fertilizer credit and 
present the results in Table 5, while applying a village and -year fixed-effects model. 
Household characteristics and household head’s characteristics are included as the 
covariates. The results are obtained from the conditional logit estimation method. Thus, 
the identification of the parameters of interest relies on within-village variation. The 
result shows that the land size has a positive and significant impact on the credit access 
but the value of asset holdings does not have a significant impact. It appears that 
cooperatives and public banks provide the fertilizer credit based on the needs of the 
recipients, represented by land size, but not based on the repayment ability of the 
recipients, because if they are concerned with the repayment ability, the value of asset 
holdings should have a significant impact on the credit access. In addition, the 
cooperatives and public banks do not seem to be gender neutral, judging from the 
negative and significant coefficient of female-headed household dummy, which 
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indicates that female headed households are less likely to receive the fertilizer credit 
than male-headed households. 
 
5.2 Impacts on the fertilizer application 
 Next, in Table 6, we present the results from the household fixed effects 
models on the quantity of inorganic fertilizer application. The results are very similar to 
what we find in Table 2. In fact, when we estimate a simple model with the credit 
dummy variable and dummies for regions, survey years, and interaction terms between 
them, column (1), we find that the impact of the credit is 36 kilograms per ha, which is 
almost identical to the increase in fertilizer use among the Late Recipient group, 36.5 
kilograms per ha, in Table 2. The estimated coefficient of the credit variable remains at 
the same level, 35.1 kilograms per ha, even when we add some time-varying household 
characteristics to the model. Because the average fertilizer application level is about 70 
kilograms per ha, according to Table 2, a 35 kg per ha increase is a 49 percent increase 
in the amount application. Because we include interaction terms of regions and survey 
years in the model, it is unlikely that the unobserved regional level shocks are correlated 
with the credit variable, thereby generating biased estimators.  
 The estimated coefficients of the other independent variables are consistent 
with our expectations. Land size has a negative coefficient on the quantity of inorganic 
fertilizer used use per ha, indicating that inorganic fertilizer is more intensely applied 
among small land holders than large land holders. The size of the estimated coefficient 
indicates that the inorganic fertilizer application increases by 0.46 kilograms when the 
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land size decreases by one percent. Asset holding also has a significant impact on the 
inorganic fertilizer application: a one percent increase in the asset holding increases the 
inorganic fertilizer application by 0.16 kilograms per ha. Thus, even when credit is 
available, the asset holding matters on the inorganic fertilizer application. This suggests 
that at least some households are still facing credit constraints and that access to cash on 
hand determines how much fertilizer they apply on crops. Finally, we find that the 
number of family members has a negative coefficient on the fertilizer application, 
suggesting that the family workers and the inorganic fertilizer are substitutes. One 
additional family worker replaces about 5 kilograms of inorganic fertilizer per ha.  
 
5.3 Impacts on crop yields and income  
To measure the impact of the credit access on crop yields, we estimate the 
yield functions of three major crops, teff, maize, and wheat, in our survey areas with the 
household fixed effects model (Table 7). The results indicate that the credit access has a 
significant impact on teff but not on maize and wheat. The estimated coefficient of the 
credit is 0.37 on teff, suggesting that the teff yield increases by 37 percent if credit is 
provided. This increase is due to the increased inorganic fertilizer use as we found find 
earlier. On the maize and wheat yields, we do not find any significant impacts. As we 
can see in Chapter 3 in this book, the farm-gate price of teff is much higher than the 
farm-gate prices of maize and wheat: the farm-gate price of teff is USD 22.6 and 32.6 
per 100 kilograms in 2004 and 2006, respectively, while the farm-gate price is USD 
10.9 and 13.0 for maize and is USD 14.0 and 20.8 for wheat in 2004 and 2006, 
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respectively. Thus, although the return also depends on returns to fertilizer use is an 
important consideration, it seems more profitable to apply inorganic fertilizer on teff 
than on maize or wheat. This could be why we find a large impact of the credit on the 
teff yields yield but not on the maize and wheat yields.  
Regarding the impact of the credit on income, we present the results on the 
crop income per ha in Table 8. In the table, we find no impact of the credit on income: 
the estimated coefficient of the credit on the crop income per ha is -0.037 and the 
t-statistics is not even close to a significant level. Crop The crop income is calculated by 
subtracting the input cost, which includes the costs of credit, fertilizer, other chemicals, 
and hired labor, from the value of crop production. The value of crop production is the 
sum of the values, evaluated at the market prices, of all crops. Because the credit access 
increases the yield of teff by 37 percent among the sample households, it should also 
increase the total value of crop production to some extent. However, the increased 
yields come with increased costs of fertilizer which are covered by the credit repayment. 
Thus, it seems that the cost of fertilizer largely offsets the increased revenue. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we evaluate the impact of the fertilizer credit on input use for 
crop production, crop choice, crop yield, and household income using a two-year panel 
data set of 420 households in rural Ethiopia. We find that the credit access increases 
inorganic fertilizer use by 35 kilograms per household. We also find that the credit 
access increases the yield of teff by 37 percent but not the other major crops, such as 
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maize and wheat. The lack of impact on little impacts on maize and wheat is are 
predictable given the low adoption rates of high-yielding varieties of maize and wheat, 
even among those households who receive the fertilizer credit. Only 20 percent of the 
maize producers adopt the high-yielding varieties of maize, and the adoption rate is 
about the same among wheat producers. Without fertilizer responsive high-yielding 
varieties, the fertilizer credit program can have only limited impacts on the crop yields 
and, hence, the farmers’ incomes. Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 2 postulated in 
Chapter 1, Ethiopian farmers do respond to the availability of fertilizer credit through 
the government program by applying more fertilizer and producing more profitable 
crops, but the credit program has no significant impacts on net crop income per 
cultivated area and the per capita income.  
The results raise a concern about the effectiveness of the credit program in 
Ethiopia in improving the living conditions of the farmers. First, the government must 
facilitate the development of private fertilizer markets to improve by reducing the 
government intervention in order to reduce the inefficient fertilizer delivery and quality 
poor fertilizer quality problems. Second, low responses to the fertilizer credit on crop 
yields should be addressed by the government. In the short term, to improve the returns 
to the credit program, the Ethiopian government needs to consider providing 
high-yielding varieties to farmers, along with the fertilizer credit. In particular, drought 
tolerant varieties should be provided because Ethiopian farmers suffer from frequent 
droughts in the country. Because the drought tolerant varieties are still new in the 
country, there is a need to conduct adoptive research on the new varieties so that the 
varieties will fit better with the local conditions. Furthermore, extension services should 
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accompany the provisions of these materials. Without such complementary materials 
and services, the fertilizer credit program will have only limited impacts on farmers’ 
welfare, and it would be difficult to continue operating such an expensive program 
without more tangible returns. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Sample Households 
 
  
Number of 
Households 
Proportions of 
Households who 
Used Fertilizer 
Proportions of 
Fertilizer Users 
who Obtained 
Credit 
Inorganic Fertilizer 
Use per ha 
(kg/ha) 
2004 2006 2004 2006 2004 2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
Amhara 39 0.33 0.46 0.10 0.18 16.6 29.9 
Oromia 
Oromiya  
       
 South East 48 0.83 0.90 0.61 0.90 58.7 67.8 
 Central 134 0.91 0.91 0.77 0.86 120.8 108.9 
 West 30 0.47 0.53 0.47 0.47 20.1 24.3 
SNNP 157 0.73 0.65 0.22 0.48 55.6 56.1 
Total 408 0.75 0.74 0.46 0.63 71.0 69.8 
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Table 2. Inorganic Fertilizer Use (kg/ha) by Access to Credit 
 
  All 
Access to Credit in 2004 and 2006 
Non 
Recipients 
Late 
Recipients 
(Received 
Credit Only 
in 2004) 
Early 
Recipients 
(Received 
Credit Only 
in 2006) 
Continuous 
Recipients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fertilizer Use (kg/ha)      
in 2004 72.6 28.0 54.3 88.1 114.6 
in 2006 70.0 17.7 90.8 69.0 96.2 
Change: 2006–2004  -2.7 -10.3 36.5*** -19.1 -18.5 
      
Number of Households 408 126 96 28 158 
 
Note: *** significant at 1% on the t-test for the difference in mean. 
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Table 3. Crop Choice (% of households) in 2004 and 2006 by Credit Access 
 
  All 
Access to Credit in 2004 and 2006 
Non 
Recipients 
Late 
Recipients 
(Received 
Credit Only 
in 2004) 
Early 
Recipients 
(Received 
Credit Only 
in 2006) 
Continuous 
Recipients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Teff      
2004 0.43  0.26 0.41 0.58 0.54 
2005 0.51  0.28 0.50 0.48 0.71 
HYV Maize      
2004 0.07  0.05 0.06 0.19 0.07 
2005 0.09  0.08 0.17 0.04 0.07 
Local Maize      
2004 0.36  0.47 0.41 0.12 0.29 
2005 0.35  0.47 0.29 0.19 0.31 
HYV Wheat      
2004 0.11  0.04 0.13 0.15 0.14 
2005 0.09  0.04 0.12 0.11 0.12 
Local Wheat      
2004 0.40  0.21 0.44 0.39 0.52 
2005 0.37  0.14 0.38 0.44 0.54 
      
Number of Households 408 126 96 28 158 
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Table 4. Crop Yields and Credit Access 
 
 Crop All 
Access to Credit 
Difference 
(3) - (2) without Credit with Credit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Teff 664.9 553.2 704.4 +151.2*** 
 (445.7) (396.2) (455.8) [40.6] 
HYV Maize 1,800.6 1,714.5 1,838.3 +123.8 
 (1,382.7) (1550.4) (1318.5) [364.1] 
Local Maize 1,233.3 1,309.3 1,130.1 -179.2 
 (1,060.9) (1149.8) (920.5) [115.8] 
HYV Wheat 1,144.5 1,080.6 1,170.1 +89.5 
 (769.1) (872.3) (730.1) [186.6] 
Local Wheat 998.1 807.5 1,071.6 +264.0*** 
 (794.7) (664.) (828.9) [78.8] 
 
Note: *** significant at 1% on the t-test for the difference in mean. Numbers in 
parentheses are standard deviations, and numbers in brackets are standard errors.   
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Table 5. Determinants of Access to Input Credit (Village FE Model
 a
) 
 
 
Received Credit (=1) 
 
  
Log of Land Size (Ha) 0.745 
 (2.05)** 
Log of Asset Holdings (Birr) 0.162 
 (1.40) 
Number of Cattle -0.013 
 (0.71) 
Log of Soil Carbon Content -0.740 
 (0.99) 
1 if Female-headed Household -0.821 
 (2.46)** 
Number of Family Members 0.068 
 (1.35) 
Dependent Ratio
b 
0.055 
 (0.10) 
Household Head's Years of Schooling -0.005 
 (0.12) 
Household Head's Age 0.001 
 (0.15) 
Interaction Terms between Region and Survey Year 
Dummies 
Included 
Observations 537 
Number of Groups (Year* Village) 57 
 
Note: Absolute value of z scores in parentheses. ** significant at 5%. 
a 
Conditional logit estimation with village*year fixed effects.
 b 
Fraction of household 
members aged 0 to 15 or over 65. 
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Table 6. Determinants of Inorganic Fertilizer Application (Household FE Models)  
 
 
Inorganic Fertilizer Application (kg/ha) 
(1) (2) 
   
Credit (=1) 36.01 35.07 
 (2.76)*** (2.62)*** 
Log of Land Size (ha)  -45.96 
  (4.37)*** 
Log of Asset Holdings (Birr)  15.84 
  (3.75)*** 
Number of Cattle  0.367 
  (1.18) 
Number of Family Members  -4.957 
  (1.73)* 
Interaction Terms between Region  
and Survey Year Dummies 
Included Included 
Observations 782 773 
Number of Households 402 402 
R-squared 0.05 0.13 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%, *** significant 
at 1%. 
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Table 7. Crop Yield (kg/ha in log) Models (Household FE Models)  
 
 
Teff Maize Wheat 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Credit (=1) 0.369 0.393 0.136 
 (2.89)** (1.41) (1.09) 
Log of Land Size (ha) 0.032 0.355 -0.058 
 (0.16) (0.96) (0.29) 
Log of Asset Holdings (Birr) -0.005 -0.102 -0.028 
 (0.08) (0.96) (0.38) 
Number of Cattle 0.006 0.008 -0.000 
 (1.43) (0.46) (0.09) 
Number of Family Members -0.089 -0.051 -0.066 
 (1.65) (0.65) (1.37) 
Constant 7.086 7.003 7.205 
 (7.75)** (4.96)** (8.66)** 
Interaction Terms between 
Region and Survey Year 
Dummies 
Included Included Included 
Observations 582 385 565 
Number of Household ID 229 214 230 
R-squared 0.11 0.09 0.06 
Note: Absolute value of robust t statistics in parentheses. ** significant at 5% 
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Table 8. Crop Income Models (Household FE models) 
 
 
Log(Crop Income per ha) 
(1) 
  
Credit (=1) -0.037 
 (0.35) 
Log of Land Size (ha) -0.845 
 (4.81)*** 
Log of Asset Holdings (Birr) 0.101 
 (1.83)* 
Number of Cattle 0.000 
 (0.03) 
Number of Family Members -0.034 
 (0.70) 
Constant 7.629 
 (12.99)*** 
Interaction Terms between Region  
and Survey Year dummies 
Included 
Observations 755 
Number of Household id 398 
R-squared 0.18 
 
Note: Absolute value of robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%, *** 
significant at 1% 
 
 
 
